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"not clear" whether such action would be successful.49 Even if it could be done,
the propriety of such action is debatable. Nevertheless, the weight to be given
to this consideration should not be exaggerated. The problem would arise only
where the government was not a party to the action-in a "private" suit-
since otherwise a court can avoid an impasse by resorting to the provisions in
the Rules for entering a default judgment against a disobedient party.3 0 Even
in the former situation it would seem that the natural reluctance of the judi-
ciary and the executive to proceed to the point of open conflict would tend to
make the courts amenable to assertions of privilege when strongly contended
for by the executive, while minimizing the likelihood of the executive's absolute
refusal to produce information which a court has ordered to be disclosed. The
possibility that a court, in a rare case, might have to meet the enforcement
problem unsuccessfully does not seem to be sufficient justification for a court,
in every case, to "abdicatle] an inherent judicial function of determining the
facts upon which the admissibility of evidence in a case depends."s'
PROOF REQUIREMENTS IN ANTI-TRUST SUITS: THE
OBSTACLES TO TREBLE DAMAGE RECOVERY
Some prerequisites for private recovery under the treble-damage provisions
of the anti-trust laws may be considered relatively well settled.' Injury must
be to a "business or property" interest2 and must be "proximately caused ' 3 by
a violation4 of those laws. A creditor, for example, does not suffer a "direct in-
49 2 Moore, Federal Practice § 34.05, n. I (ist ed., 1938).
so United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 721 (La., i949), aff'd (by
equally divided court) 18 U. S.L. Week 3297 (Apr. 25, ig5o). It has been suggested that the
public-private test (see text at note 4o supra) may be justified because of this consideration,
Government Privilege against Disclosure of Official Documents, 58 Yale L.J. 993, 998 (I949).
s, Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (Hawaii, 1947).
1 Section 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (i89o), IS U.S.C.A. § IS (194x), is
as follows: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person
or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue
therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (i94), IS U.S.C.A. § 15 (I94i), adds only that
'the defendant may be sued in the district in which "he has an agent."
2 Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Coal Co., 72 F. 2d 885 (C.A. 4th, 1934); Louisiana Farmers
P. U. v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 40 F. Supp. 897 (Ark., 1941); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (igog). "While the antitrust laws are for the public benefit. .an
... action to recover damages is personal.., and not for the benefit of the public. [Plaintiff]
must seek personalpecuniary damages." Maltz v. Sax, 134 F. 2d 2, 5 (C.A.7th, 1943). i Toum-
lin's Anti-Trust Laws § 20.8 (1949).
3 Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., '41 F. 2d 972 (C.A. 2d, 1944).
4 Various activities prohibited by the anti-trust laws have led to recovery of treble damages:
monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Ma-
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jury" to his business by illegal restraints on his debtors though a lessor en-
titled to a percentage of his lessee's profits is so harmed.6 An injury to a corpora-
tion's "business or property" may justify recovery in the corporation's behalf,7
but it is not at the same time actionable by stockholders, officers, and directors
qua individuals, since individual business or property has not been injured.'
The requirements of "direct injury" to "business or property" may be met al-
though the parties are not competitors. Thus a sales agent whose position was
eliminated by his employer's vertical expansion has recovered,9 as have ultimate
consumers injured by conspiratorial increases in price"' and middlemen and re-
tailers victimized by discrimination." Needless to say, each successful plaintiff
must have engaged in12 or must have intended to engage in,'3 some lawful
business.
Having established the fact of direct injury to business or property, plaintiffs
terials Co. 273 U.S. 359 (1927); price fixing, Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1947); boycotts, Loder v. Jayne, 142 F. xo0 (C.C. Pa., i9o6);
blacklisting, Montague v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (i9o4); resale price maintenance, Strauss v. Vic-
tor Talking Machine Co., 297 F. 791 (C.A. 2d, 1924); price discrimination, Bruices Juices, Inc.
v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. o85 (Fla., 1949); illegal integrations, Roseland v. Phister
Mfg. Co., 125 F. 2d 417 (C.A. 7th, 1942); acquisition of control of a competing corporation to
remove it from the market, Ames v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.
Mass., 19o9); and illegal control of markets by means of license agreements, Victor Talking
Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 8io (C.A. 3rd, 1921). See Recovery of Treble Damages Under
the Sherman Act, 38 Yale L. J. 5o3 (1929).
s Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F. 2d 417 (C.A. 7th, 1942), and cases cited.
6 Camrel Co., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv.
57,233 (N.Y., 1944).
7 A stock holder may sue for the benefit of the corporation, Pa. Sugar Refining Co. v. Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Co., i66 F. 254 (C.A. 2d, 19o8); Ames v. A. T. & T. Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.
Mass., i9o9). So, when the plaintiff is a corporation suing its officers or directors, it is not con-
sidered to be in pari delecti. Procedure in Private Suits under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
32 Col. L. Rev. 335 (1932).
$ Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F. 2d 959 (N.Y., 1929).
9 Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F. 2d 417 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
ro Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 2o3 U.S. 390 (i9o6).
11 Bruices Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (Fla., 1949); Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 15o F. 2d 988 (C.A. 8th, 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. 773 (i945),
noted 44 Mich. L. Rev. 68o (r946); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. 2d 763
(C.A. 7 th, 193o), noted 44 Harv. L. Rev. 867 (93i). See text at note 41 infra.
"2Maltz v. Sax, 134 F. 2d 2 (C.A. 7th, 1943).
13 "It is not necessary under the statute [Clayton Act] to aver an injury to a specific going
business but.. . 'it is necessary to state facts showing an intention and preparedness to enter
business.'" Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Electrical Products Corp., 152 F. 2d
398, 39o (C.A. 3d, 1945), quoting American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., i66 F. 261, 264
(C.A. 2d, I9o8). In practice the difficulties involved in proof of damages by one who has not
yet entered business may defeat a good claim, especially where the court only recognizes the
loss-of-profits technique. Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, iii F. 96 (C.A. 8th, i9oi).
Compare Win. Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 1o3 (Pa., 1946).
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are then faced with the difficult task of choosing a method of proving the extent
of harm. Theoretically, one might assume that the measure of damages in any
case should be the actual pecuniary losses suffered by the plaintiff, and that
these should be measured by comparing actual with probable profits during
the period of the wrong and adjusting for fluctuations not assignable to the
defendant's conduct. But because situations arise in which the decline in net
profits does not fully measure the extent of harm, damage claims based on a
showing of unlawfully increased costs or decreased revenue have been approved.
Which of the factors of loss-diminished net profitr4 diminished gross revenue,s
or increased costs' 6-a plaintiff ultimately relies on will depend on his estimation
of the relative availability of evidence and the likelihood of recovery. 7
Both the diminished revenue and lost profits methods involve an inference
as to the amount of plaintiff's gross revenue and profits if defendant's illegal
activities had not interfered. 8 In lightening plaintiff's burden of proving "what
might have been," courts recently have permitted "probable and inferential
proof" where none better was available.x9 Thus juries have been allowed to de-
- Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
Is Although lost profits and increased costs were early considered elements of loss under
the Sherman Act, recovery for diminished revenue was first permitted in Story Parchment Co.
v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (I93i). In a suit for damages by a plaintiff
injured in a price war with other parchment paper manufacturers, the Supreme Court upheld
a charge to the jury which bade them consider as an element of damages "the difference be-
tween the prices actually received and what would have been received but for the unlawful
conspiracy." The method of establishing damages approved by the trial judge had been clearly
differentiated in the circuit court from the loss of profits technique, and although recovery was
there denied because of uncertainty as to the amount of damages, the method was approved on
analogy with decisions in which the only injury shown was increased cost.
z6 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., i5o F. 2d 988 (C.A. 8th, 1945).
'7 Since both increased costs and diminished revenues affect the calculation of net profits,
a plaintiff must choose between net profits and the other elements of injury in estimating
extent of damage. He may, of course, choose whichever is the larger. Win. Goldman Theatres,
Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. xo3 (Pa., 1946). Where in addition to any of these elements of
loss, he has suffered a decline in the value of his property, he may count the decline as addition-
al loss. If the decline is taken into account in estimating any of the above elements, it may
not be counted again. Ibid., at io5. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555 (I93r)
18 The diminished-revenue method merely requires that the plaintiff establish what his gross
revenue would have been if the defendant's illegal activities had not interfered, three times the
difference between expected gross revenue and revenue actually received being the formula for
determining damages. The loss-of-profits technique may also require a showing of putative
costs since the usual formula calls for trebling the difference between estimated profits and
profits actually received during the period of the wrong. As a practical matter, however, the
showing of prospective costs seems to have been no more difficult than a showing of prospec-
tive gross revenue, and no decision has been lost by a plaintiff who has successfully established
prospective gross revenue while failing to establish prospective costs. Those who have found
it difficult to establish either prospective revenue or prospective costs have been permitted
to fix amount of damages by comparison with a competing business.
19 "Where the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more precise computation, the
jury may not render a verdict based on speculation or guesswork. But the jury may make a
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rive significant differences between actual and possible receipts from analysis of
plaintiff's business data before the wrong complained of and from expert
testimony as to the probable growth of plaintiff's business.2° And in several
cases, plaintiffs have simply presented juries with a mass of evidence as to past
earnings, expenses, and profits, and left them to draw their inferences2r No
definite rules have been announced which prescribe the number of years from
which evidence of past earnings is to be drawn-profit histories of only one
year have been allowed2 In justifying conjectural proof the courts frequently
have said that since the defendant's wrong rendered acquisition of adequate
data impossible, "only the fact and not the amount of damage need be cer-
tain .23
In addition, recent courts havie tended to relax rules requiring a causal con-
nection between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's activities. Changes
in market conditions may have contributed as substantially as the defendant's
conduct to the plaintiff's business decline. While these uncertain factors have
provided a barrier to many plaintiffs' claims,)4 recent explicit pronouncements
by the Supreme Court require only a showing of expected profit or revenue
losses to establish a prima facie case, and place upon the defendant the burden
of establishing that portion of the total loss not attributable to defendant's un-
lawful activity.2
S
just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data, and render its verdict ac-
cordingly. In such circumstances 'juries are allowed to act on probable and inferential as well
as [upon] direct and positive proof.' " Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264
(1946), quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 564
(1931)-
2* Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (r946).
21 William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters (Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Same),
42 F. 2d 152 (C.A. 2d, 1930). Donovan and Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust
Laws, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 511, Sr5 (1940).
- William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters (Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Same),
42 F. 2d 152 (C.A. 2d, i93o).
23 This is the customary rule. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282
U.S. 555, 564 (1931). However, in Win. Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp.
1o3 (Pa., 1946), recovery was granted a theatre owner who was prevented from commencing
operations by defendant's illegal operations. In perhaps the only decision of its kind, the court
discusses the significance of three major factors-cost, selling price, and sales volume. Since
plaintiff's business was a theatre, his costs and selling prices were relatively fixed, and his vol-
ume was determined by comparison with a neighboring theatre of similar location and reputa-
tion. The court pointed out that the relatively standardized character of the movie industry,
as opposed to other industries, made it possible to consider these elements in determining the
amount of plaintiff's interrupted revenue.
'4 Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, iii F. 96 (C.A. 8th, 1911); Locker v. American
Tobacco Co., 218 F. 447 (C.A. 2d, 19r4); American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 F.
77 (C.A. 2d, x915).
2S The jury may conclude "as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the proof of
defendant's wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiff's business, and from the evi-
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In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,26 the Supreme Court approved an
alternative method of establishing lost profits which may significantly ease the
burden of proving "what might have been." There a theatre owner's evidence
consisted of (i) a comparison of profits prior to the restraint with probable prof-
its afterwards, and (2) a comparison of actual profits during the period of re-
straint with the profits of a comparable competing theatre owned by the de-
fendant. The fact that the two methods established similar results strengthened
the proof. This comparative method is most effective where the conduct com-
plained of has barred the plaintiff's entrance into the field,27 a situation in which
alternative methods of proof are not otherwise available because the plaintiff
lacks a history of revenue, cost, and earnings.
In cases where unlawful refusals to sell particular merchandise do not result
in appreciable diminution of over-all profits, losses on the particular merchan-
dise may measure damage. Thus in Frey & Son, Inc. v. Welch Grape Juice Co.2
8
the defendant had sold plaintiff 19o cases of grape juice in I911, but thereafter
refused to supply him. Plaintiff's evidence as to previous gross profit per unit,
less attaching costs, was considered relevant, and recovery was permitted de-
spite the general increase in plaintiff's business after the refusal.29
It has frequently been stated that deprivations of monopoly profits are not
compensable, and that a plaintiff must establish what his profits would have
been in a "competitive" market.30 Yet courts have realized that literal adher-
dence of the decline in prices, profits, and values, not shown to be attributable to other causes,
the defendants' wrongful acts had caused damage to the plaintiffs." Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc.,'327 U.S. 25i, 264 (1946). Proof of Damages under the Anti-Trust Laws, 41 Ill.
L. Rev. 462, 464 (1946). In placing the burden of uncertainty on the wrongdoer, the courts
have followed a venerable common law principle which has been applied in trademark and
admiralty cases, and the law of confusion of goods. Armory v. Delamire, 1 Strange 505 (1722).
Developments in the Law-Damages, 6i Harv. L. Rev. 113, 187 (i947).
26327 U.S. 251 (1946).
271n Win. Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 69 F. Supp. 1o3 (Pa., 1946). The case
is noteworthy in its discussion of the elements which make one theatre comparable with
another, a question which the Supreme Court treated most cavalierly in the Bigelow case.
Although proof of damages by the method of comparison was upheld in Theatre Inv. Co. v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 650 (Wash., 1947), the court considered the tradi-
tional methods of proving lost profits to be more reliable and only reluctantly authorized the
method of comparison.
28 240 Fed. 114 (C.A. 4 th, 1917), cert. den. 251 U.S. 551 (1r9).
29 Although a general increase in business during the period of the wrong will usually make
it difficult to show loss of anticipated profits, in this case plaintiff's business upturn was help-
ful in establishing what he would have made on the boycotted merchandise.
"°In Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 81o (C.A. 3d, 1921), appellant had
sought to maintain both wholesaleand retail prices by means of a licensing system. Kemeny, a
retailer, refused to heed defendant's instructions and was boycotted. Concerning his attempt
to compute as damages anticipated profits based on the illegally maintained prices, the court
said: "Profits which the plaintiff could anticipate.., were only such as he could earn lawfully
in a competitive market. Such profits can not ... be ascertained from profits which he had
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ence to such a rule would erect an almost insurmountable evidentiary barrier,
and recent cases have ignored it in fact. Thus, in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co.,31 damages were awarded on the basis of a projection of
prices existing before the activity complained of, although the defendants had
always controlled the business, the price structure was clearly noncompetitive,
and the plaintiff was an unestablished, probably undercapitalized organization
whose success was at least conjectural.
Lack of agreement as to whether damages awarded under the anti-trust laws
are punitive or compensatory has created special problems for plaintiffs in in-
creased-cost situations. On the theory that the damage award is punitive, an
increased cost passed on to purchasers might still measure damages; but if the
award is to be considered compensatory in nature, a strict definition of "loss"
might deprive the plaintiff of recovery.3'
Prior to 1941, there was little question that illegally increased costs measured
damages even though not shown to have been absorbed by the plaintiff. Thus
a shipper charged discriminatory rates in Thomsen v. Union Castle Mail S.
S. Co.33 "was damaged within the meaning of the statute [Sherman Act] to the
extent of... sums.., paid.. ." in excess of reasonable rates, without con-
sideration of actual pecuniary loss. However, a series of decisions growing out of
earned under a system whose sole purpose was to maintain prices, restrict competition, and
create monopoly." Ibid., at 8ig. However, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materi-
als Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1917), the Supreme Court, in permitting a jury to consider evidence of
past earnings gathered from a noncompetitive market, approved a charge to the jury which
bade it reduce damages based on such evidence to damages which would have been suffered in
"normal business." Ibid., at 377. How this is to be accomplished is the jury's secret, and, pre-
sumably, if an appellate court thinks that the reduction has not been proper, it may reverse.
In any event, the harshness of the Kemeny rule is mitigated by the Eastman Kodak decision
in cases where proper instructions have been given.
31' 282 U.S. 555 (1931). See the circuit court's opinion in the Story case, 37 F. 2d 537 (C.A.
ist, 1930). Procedure in Private Suits under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 32 Col. L. Rev.
335, 344 n. 63 (1932).
32 "Plaintiffs are seeking, not compensation for damages suffered by defendant's illegal acts,
but profits because of said acts.. . . The Sherman... and the Clayton Act[s] afford a cause
of action for those suffering damages. In their provisions for damages they embody both
punitive and compensatory damages but no recovery can be had unless a case for compensa-
tory damages is made. In the event of compensatory damages, then automatically punitive
damages follow." Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F. 2d 58o, 582 (C.A. 8th, i945),
cert. den. 326U.S. 734 (1945)- Compare Haskell v. Perkins, 28F. 2d 222 (N.J., 1928); Recovery
of Treble Damages under the Sherman Act, 38 Yale L. J. 503 (1929). A good discussion of this
problem may be found in Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or
Compensatory? 28 Ky. L. J. 1I7 (1940).
Even if the treble-damages provisions are compensatory rather than punitive, the rights
of claimants injured by cost increases might remain unsettled. What constitutes injury under
a compensatory statute might still be debated, and, as cases in other fields indicate, the con-
cept of injury is subject to many interpretations. Compare Webb v. Portland Manufacturing
Co., 3 Sumner 189 (C.C. ist, 1838); Stratton v. Mount Herman Boys School, 216 Mass. 83,
1o3 AtL. 87 (913).
33 166 Fed. 251 (C.A. 2d, 19o8).
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United States v. Socony-Vauum Oil Co. 34 required a showing that costs which
had increased as a result of market-wide price fixing agreements had not been
passed on to consumers.
For example in Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,31 a factor which had un-
doubtedly influenced all the courts in the Socony-Vacuum group of cases was
made explicit. Because every jobber's costs had been increased by the same
amount, and because the wholesale market was highly competitive, it was said
that the increased cost was passed on by all in the form of uniformly higher
prices. The market-wide nature of the illegal cost increase was held to dis-
tinguish the case from price discrimination situations in which the inability
of the plaintiff to pass on increased costs is readily apparent.
It is clear, however, that the cost increase in the Leonard case would tend to
reduce output and profits for the entire group of wholesalers. Output of a par-
ticular jobber would remain at the reduced level until some competitors were
forced to leave the.industry. While it might be difficult to calculate the de-
creased profit suffered by an individual firm, statements that wholesalers as
a group could not have been injured by the cost increase are clearly false. And
since other courts had found that the fact rather than the amount of lost profit
was the significant element,36 recoveries might have been justified although the
precise extent of injury was uncertain.
In any event, the Socony-Vacuum series of cases ignored previous Sherman
Act decisions refusing to require actual pecuniary loss37 and erroneously sought
34 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3io U.S. 15o (194o), noted 89 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 683 (194). Defendants were convicted of conspiring to fix the price of gasoline sold to
Midwest jobbers by manipulating the spot market price. Following judgment in this case,
jobbers who claimed that they had been injured by the price increases manipulated by the
conspirators sued for treble damages. See for example, Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
148 F. 2d 58o (C.A. 8th, 1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F. 2d
967 (C.A. 7th, 1943); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (Wis., 1942);
Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., ig F. 2d 747 (C.A. 8th, 1941).
Is 42 F. Supp. 369 (Wis., 194r).
36 Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 56I (I93'). See text at note 23 supra.
37 Peto v. Howell, o10 F. 2d 353 (C.A. 7th 1938) (a purchaser may recover from a defendant
who illegally cornered the grain market in Chicago the difference between the reasonable price
and the price he had to pay); Strauss v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 F. 791 (C.A. 2d, 1924)
(measure of damages is the difference between the price a retailer was compelled to pay as a
result of a boycott and the reasonable price); Monarch Tobacco Works v. American Tobacco
Co., 165 Fed. 774 (C.C. Ky., 1908) (measure of damages is the difference between the price the
plaintiff was compelled to pay because of the illegal combination and the price he should have
paid); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (i917), discussed in text at note 33 supra; United States
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 163 Fed. 701 (C.C. N.Y., z9o8) (excessive price charged
for licorice paste less the reasonable price is the measure of damages); Loder v. Jayne, 142 Fed.
1oo (C.C. Pa., i9o6) (plaintiff who was injured by a boycott may recover the difference be-
tween the price paid and the price it would have paid the defendant); Chattanooga Foundry
Co. v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (I9o6) (plaintiff, the ultimate consumer, who was injured by an
illegal price increase, may recover the difference between what it paid and what it would have
paid if not for the unlawful combination).
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support in cases arising under the Interstate Commerce Act.3s In these latter
decisions shippers injured by rate discriminations were refused damages based
on the amount of rebates paid to competing shippers because the increases had
been borne by the public. Ignored was the general language of later Interstate
Commerce cases which undermined the decisions relied on even when they are
restricted to their peculiar facts. Thus, in Adams v. Mills,39 a shipper was al-
lowed to recover where, instead of rate discrimination by means of the rebate
device, the railroads had simply forced the injured party to pay a higher rate
than his competitors. The court considered lack of evidence as to increase ab-
sorption by the plaintiff immaterial, remarking that "if the defendants exacted
from them an unlawful charge, the exaction was a tort, for which the plaintiffs
were entitled, as for other torts, to [recovery] from the wrongdoer."40
Principles analogous to those announced in these later Interstate Com-
merce cases have been adopted in price discrimination decisions under the anti-
trust laws.4' It has generally been held that the plaintiff in such a case may claim
damages for loss of profits or for the amount of the discriminatory price differ-
ence, without question as to whether increased costs had been passed on to the
consumer. In Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co.,42 damages were sought
on evidence that the defendant had paid one-half the salary of plaintiff's clerk
who sold defendant's product, while it paid the full salary of the clerk of a
competing firm. The defense that plaintiff had not attempted to show loss of
profits was disposed of on the grounds that he had "suffered a direct loss in the
increased cost of operation ... to the extent of the difference in the allowances
arbitrarily made.",3 Furthermore, "to relieve the seller of the obligation to
equalize such a discrimination through readily determinable general damages,
where no special damages exist or are claimed, would be to weaken the effec-
tiveness of the statute."44 Earlier decisions under the Interstate Commerce
Act relied on in the Socony-Vacuum cases were held inapplicable.
Aside from the weakness of the precedents relied on, criticism may be di-
38 See for example Pa. R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913).
39 286 U.S. 397 (1932).
40 Justice Holmes' statement in Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell Taenzer Lumber Co., 245
U.S. 531 (1918), is equally illuminating: "The only question before us is that at which we have
hinted: whether the fact that the plaintiffs were able to pass on the damages that they sustained
in the first instance by paying the unreasonable charge, and to collect that amount from the
purchasers, prevents their recovering the overpayment from the carriers. The answer is not
difficult. The general tendency of the law, in regards to damages at least, is not to go beyond
the first step. As it does not attribute remote consequences to a defendant so it holds him
liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss. The plaintiffs suffered losses to the amount
of the verdict when they paid. Their claim accrued at once in the theory of the law and it does
not inquire into later events." Ibid., at 533-34-
4' Cases cited note ir supra.
42 ISo F. 2d 988 (1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. 773 (i945).
43 Ibid., at 996. 44 Ibid., at 997.
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rected at the Socony-Vacuum cases for their misinterpretation of the role treble-
damage actions play in the enforcement of the anti-trust laws. Rules, eviden-
•tiary or otherwise, which emphasize the compensatory rather than the punitive
nature of these actions ignore their historical and legislative purposes. The very
fact of the "times three" formula demonstrates their punitive characteristics.4S
Indeed, it can be said that without the treble damage sanction, the meagre
nature of the criminal penalties arising from governmental actions would
render the anti-trust laws nugatory. For example, the Socony-Vacuum case,
which cost $2oo,ooo and took four years to prosecute, resulted in a fine of only
$65,000 divided among seventeen defendants.4 While it is true that treble-
damage actions are usually brought in the wake of Justice Department victories,
such actions, when they are successful, materially increase the factors deterring
violhtion of the anti-trust laws. That such was the intention of Congress cannot
be doubted.
To what extent have the intentions of Congress been met? One hundred
seventy-five treble-damage actions were reported during the first fifty years of
Sherman Act enforcement. Plaintiffs were successful in only thirteen of these,
recovering $1,270,000.00, while decisions awarding an additional $12,756,ooo.oo
were overruled by appellate courts.47 Although these facts do not support an
inference of judicial hostility to treble-damage actions, the vagaries in proof of
damage rules outlined above may display judicial hesitancy to support the
sanction.
Many reasons for the paucity of successful actions may be suggested; it is
clear, however, that the uncertain state of the law relating to proof of damages
is an important factor. The rule of the Bigelow case giving the plaintiff the
benefit of a presumption that his business decline is due to the defendant's ac-
tivities; recent tendencies to ignore the requirement that in estimating lost
profits comparison be made with a competitive market; the general relaxation
of the certainty rule in favor of the plaintiff-all of these may be expected to
encourage claimants who now find the outcome of a suit for treble damages too
uncertain to warrant action in the courts. What is now needed is a further
crystallization of these rules, and a forthright acknowledgment of the purpose
of the anti-trust laws in the lower federal courts.
45 Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 Yale L. J. 284 (1939); Void, Are Threefold
Damages Under the Anti-Trust Laws Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L. J. 117 (1940).
46 Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 Yale L. J. 284, 298 (1939).
47 Suits in which nonwritten opinions were rendered likewise showed a small number of
successful actions. Thus, of the forty-one private suits pending during 1938, one was disposed
of by judgment, two by consent, confession, or compromise, thirty-six were dismissed, dis-
continued, withdrawn, or nonsuited; and one was otherwise disposed of. Annual Report of the
Attorney General of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 3o, 1938, 233. It is ap-
parent that although favorable judgments were not granted in most cases, many satisfactory
settlements out of court could have been made. Donovan and Irvine, Proof of Damages Under
the Anti-Trust Laws, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 511, 526 (i94o).
